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Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Sen (1976) and Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) , a flourishing literature has extended the normative approach of poverty measurement to the multidimensional case. In this paper we focus on multidimensional poverty measurement in situations where the multiple attributes in which an individual can be deprived are represented by dichotomized variables. This practice is conventionally adopted by statistical agencies, where information on whether people have income below a poverty threshold, suffer from poor health, lack social network, etc is collected (see e.g. Guio et al., 2009, or Alkire and Santos, 2010) . The number of dimensions for which each individual suffers from deprivation may be summarised in a "deprivation count" (see Atkinson, 2003) . Bossert et al. (2007) use the counting approach to analyse social exclusion in a dynamic context. Bossert et al. (2009) , Lasso de La Vega and Urrutia (2011) and Alkire and Foster (2011) provide alternative axiomatic foundations of deprivation measures based on the counting approach.
Being deprived on a single dimension could result from the combination of a threshold and a continuous or discrete variable (e.g. income, or number of healthy days for year). In what follows it is supposed that available data only contain information on whether an individual is deprived or not on each dimension. This simplification allows us to delve into the question underlying the "identification" of the poor. Should we define poor only as those people suffering from deprivation on all dimensions or those that suffer from at least one dimension? These two opposite views correspond to the so-called "intersection" and "union" approaches in multidimensional poverty assessment. A related issue associated with multidimensional poverty analysis concerns the order in which the individual observations are aggregated (see Weymark 2006) . Let us consider n individuals and r dimensions. Aggregating first individuals' deprivation on each dimension, the resulting indicators can be subsequently aggregated over the r dimensions generating an overall deprivation measure. The Human Poverty Index (HPI) is a prominent example of this approach.
1 By contrast, this paper relies on the opposite order of aggregation. First, by aggregating across the single dimensions for each individual a "deprivation count" is identified, representing the number of dimensions for which the individual suffers from deprivation. Second, an axiomatic approach is used to derive measures of deprivation that summarize the distribution of deprivation counts across individuals. As apposed to the HPI, this approach accounts for the association between deprivation indicators. Moreover, these measures of deprivation are shown to be decomposable with regard to the mean and the dispersion of deprivation counts, similarly as the mean-inequality trade-off for rank-dependent social welfare functions. Atkinson (2003) investigated the relationship between expected utility type of summary measures of deprivation and the correlation between different attributes. 2 In the spirit of Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) , Atkinson stressed the relevance of the sign of the cross derivatives of the individual "utility" function with respect to its arguments, and expressed doubts about the expected utility approach as the most attractive method for analysing counting data. By drawing on the rank-dependent theory of inequality measurement (Yaari 1987 , Aaberge 2001 ) this paper introduces alternative ranking criteria for distributions of deprivation counts, where the conditions on the derivatives of the utility function arising from the expected utility model are shown to be replaced by simple conditions on a weight function used to distort probabilities in the rank-dependent framework. The shape of the weight function reveals whether the concern of the social planner is turned towards those people suffering from deprivation on all dimensions or those suffering from at least one dimension. This distinction is demonstrated also to be captured by two alternative partial orders; second-degree upward and downward count distribution dominance, which refines the trivial ranking imposed by Pareto dominance (or first-degree stochastic dominance) over the set of deprivation count distributions. We show that second-degree upward dominance generalizes the union approach whereas downward dominance generalizes the intersection approach. In order to provide a normative justification of the dominance criteria we introduce alternative principles of association (correlation) rearrangements, where either the marginal distributions or the mean deprivation are assumed to be kept fixed. The former case is analogue to the correlation-based rearrangement principles discussed in the literature (se e.g. Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982 , Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003 and Atkinson, 2003 . However, as apposed to the previous literature we will make a distinction between whether an association rearrangement comes from a distribution characterized by positive or negative association between two or several deprivation indicators, in the spirit of the statistical literature on measurement of association in multidimensional contingency tables (formed by two or several dichotomous variables).The introduced association increasing/decreasing rearrangement principles will be proved to support second-degree downward/upward dominance under the condition of unchanged marginal distributions; i.e. the number of people suffering from each of the deprivation indicators are kept fixed. However, since real world interventions normally concern trade-offs that allow reduction in one deprivation indicator at the expense of a rise in another deprivation indicator, we find it attractive to introduce less restrictive association increasing/decreasing rearrangement principles that rely on the condition of fixed number of total deprivations rather than on the condition of keeping the number suffering from each of the indicators fixed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of deprivation measures. These deprivation measures generate linear orders on the set of deprivation count distributions and are shown to allow decomposition with regard to the extent and spread of deprivation counts. Second, to generalize the "union" and intersection" approaches, the criteria of second-degree upward and downward dominance are introduced. These criteria are shown to be equivalent to the intersection of linear orders on the set of deprivation count distributions generated by well-defined sets of deprivation measures. Section 3 discusses various association intervention principles linked to second-degree upward and downward dominance criteria and their relationship to two subfamilies of deprivation measures. Section 4 explains how the framework can be extended to account for different weights. A brief summary of the main results is given in Section 5. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
Ranking distributions of deprivation counts
We consider a situation where individuals might suffer from r different dimensions of deprivation. Let X i be equal to 1 if an individual suffers from deprivation in the dimension i and 0 otherwise. Moreover, let Although F is a discrete distribution function we will for notational convenience occasionally use the integration symbol when we aggregate across count distributions.
Axiomatic justification of deprivation measures
Next, let F denotes the family of deprivation count distributions. A social planner's ranking over F can be represented by a preference relation f , which will be assumed to satisfy the following axioms:
Axiom 1 (Order) . f Is transitive and complete over F.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For each F
Axiom 3 (First Stochastic Dominance FSD) . 
The first three axioms are quite conventional. Axiom 4 was introduced by Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 as an alternative to the independence axiom of the expected utility theory. This axiom requires that the ordering of distributions is invariant with respect to certain changes in the distributions being compared. If F 1 is weakly preferred to F 2 , then Axiom 4 states that any mixture on 1 1 F − is weakly preferred to the corresponding mixture on 1 2 F − . The intuition is that identical mixing interventions on the inverse distribution functions being compared do not affect the ranking of distributions.
To illustrate this averaging operation, let us consider the problem of evaluating the average deprivation within couples obtained by matching men and women with the same rank in the male and female deprivation count distributions (i.e. the most deprived man is matched with the most deprived woman, the second deprived man with the second deprived woman, and so on). Dual independence means that, given any initial distribution F 3 of deprivation over the female population, if within the male population, distribution F 1 is deemed to contain less deprivation than distribution F 2 , this judgement is preserved after the matching with the women. Axiom 4 requires this property regardless of the initial patterns of deprivation and of the weights associated to male and female deprivation counts computing the average deprivation at the household level. For a proof of Theorem 2.1 we refer to Yaari (1987) . Note, however, that Axiom 3 differs from the monotonicity axiom of Yaari (1987) , which explains why Γ is non-decreasing. 
Partial orders
To deal with situations where deprivation count distributions intersect, weaker dominance criteria than first-degree dominance (Axiom 3) are called for. As will be demonstrated below it will be useful to make a distinction between aggregating across count distributions from below and from above. We first introduce the "second-degree downward dominance" criterion.
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1 u ∈ .
A social planner who implements second-degree downward count distribution dominance is especially concerned about those people who suffer from deprivation over many dimensions. However, an alternative ranking criterion that focuses attention on those who suffer deprivation from few dimensions can be obtained by aggregating the deprivation count distribution from below.
and strict inequality holds strictly for some 0,1 u ∈ .
Note that second-degree downward as well as upward count distribution dominance preserves first-degree dominance (Axiom 3) since first-degree dominance implies second-degree downward and upward dominance. 
Note that ( 0 ) 0 
(Proof in Appendix). 
THEOREM 2.2B. Let F 1 and F 2 be members of F. Then the following statements are equivalent,
(Proof in Appendix).
Note that even though members of 1 Ω and 2 Ω are strict convex and strict concave we will below denote them as convex and concave functions.
Decomposition of deprivation measures
As is well-known social welfare measures derived from the expected and rank-dependent utility theories allow multiplicative decompositions with regard to the mean and the inequality of income distributions (see Atkinson, 1970 and Yaari, 1988 ). An extension to the multidimensional case has been considered by Weymark (2006) . In this section we show that the deprivation measures introduced above admit an analogous decomposition in terms of the mean and the dispersion of the deprivation count distributions. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the structure of this decomposition depends on whether the preferences of the social planner are more in line with the union or with the intersection approach.
The following example motivates the methods introduced in this section:
Example 1. Two alternative policies produce the following distributions of two-dimensional deprivation: 1 F , where 50 per cent of the population suffers from one dimension and the remaining 50 per cent suffers from the other dimension; 2 F where 50 per cent of the population does not suffer from any deprivation and the remaining 50 per cent suffers from both dimensions. Thus, the mean number of deprivation is 1 for both distributions, but the intersection measure ranks 1 F to be preferable to 2 F whereas the union measure ranks 2 F to be preferable to 1 F . An interesting question is which restrictions on Γ that guarantee that D Γ ranks 1 F to be preferable to 2 F or vice versa.
As it will be demonstrated below, the ranking of 1 F and 2 F provided by D Γ depends on whether Γ is convex or concave, which according to Theorems 2.2A and 2.2B depend on whether the social planner favors second-degree downward or upward count distribution dominance. This judgment can be equivalently expressed in terms of the mean and the dispersion of the deprivation count distributions. The intuition of this result is now presented through the two-dimensional case, then the general r-dimensional case follows. , and let 
where (2) Note that Γ can be interpreted as a preference function of a social planner that assigns lower weights for one than for two deprivation counts.
To supplement the information provided by 
F when is convex D F F when is concave
Thus, by using (2.10) we may identify the contribution to D Γ from the average number of deprivations ( µ ) as well as from the dispersion of deprivations across the population.
Moreover, expression (2.10) demonstrates that a social planner who is concerned about reducing the mean number of deprivations as well as the dispersion of deprivations across the population will use a measure D Γ with a convex Γ whenever he/she pays particular attention to people who suffer from many deprivations. By contrast, when the social planner uses criterion D Γ with a concave Γ , he/she is more concerned about the number of people who are deprived on at least one dimension (the union approach) as compared to individuals deprived on all dimensions (the intersection approach). In this case D Γ can be expressed as the difference between the mean number of deprivations in the population and the dispersion of deprivations across the population. Thus, with Γ concave, D Γ decreases when Γ ∆ 
( ) D F
Γ increases when the number of deprivations at the middle of the count distribution is shifted towards the tails, under the condition of fixed total number of deprivations. However, when Γ is concave, the summary measure
decreases as a consequence of a mean preserving spread. This is due to the fact that such an operation will increase the number of people who do not suffer from any deprivation and/or suffer from a few dimensions of deprivation.
As for the two-dimensional case, we get by inserting for 
Note that i ∆ can be considered as a measure of left-spread when 0 i 1 < < and a measure of right-spread when i 1 > . The next sub-section will clarify the relationship between a mean preserving spread, second-degree upward and downward count distribution dominance and association rearrangements.
Association rearrangements
To provide a normative justification of upward and downward count distribution dominance as well as for employing the deprivation measures D Γ for concave and convex Γ , we introduce association intervention principles similar to those discussed by Epstein and Tanny (1980) , Boland and Proschan (1988) and Tsui (1999 Tsui ( , 2002 . We will analyze rearrangements in the achievement space that lead to mean-preserving spreads/contractions in the space of the deprivation counts. The previous literature does not distinguish between positive and negative association (or correlation). By contrast, we make a distinction between whether an association rearrangement comes from a distribution characterized by positive or negative association between two or several deprivation indicators, in the spirit of the statistical literature on measurement of association in multidimensional contingency tables (formed by two or several dicotomous variables). Various authors (see e.g. Yule, 1910 and Mosteller, 1968) . For 2x2 tables (see Table 3 .1) this objective corresponds to introducing measures of association that are invariant under the transformation 0 . In the former case there is perfect negative association between the two indicators, whereas it is perfect positive association in the latter case. Accordingly, it is required to make a distinction between positive association increasing rearrangements, positive association decreasing rearrangements, negative association increasing rearrangements and negative association decreasing rearrangements 6 .
DEFINITION 3.1A. Consider a 2x2 table with parameters 00 01 10 11 ( p , p , p , p ) where ( p , p , p , p ) where
The following marginal-free change
to provide a marginal distributions preserving negative association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement if
An illustration is provided in the tables below, where the right (left) panel of Table 3 .1 is obtained from the left (right) panel by a positive association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement, whereas the right (left) panel of Table 3 .2 can be obtained from the left (right) panel by a negative association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement. 
Mean preserving association rearrangements
The association increasing/decreasing rearrangement principles defined by Definitions 3.1A and 3.1B prove to support second-degree downward/upward dominance under the condition of unchanged marginal distributions; i.e. the number of people suffering from each of the deprivation indicators are kept fixed. However, since real world interventions normally concern trade-offs that allow reduction in one deprivation indicator at the cost of a rise in another deprivation indicator, we find it attractive to introduce association increasing/decreasing rearrangement principles that rely on the condition of fixed number of total deprivations, rather than on the condition of keeping the number suffering from each of the indicators fixed. Since the correlation coefficient does not satisfy the invariance condition (3.1) it is not fully informative about the association between two variables, and consequently inappropriate as a measure of association for defining mean preserving increasing (decreasing) rearrangement principles. This limitation of the correlation coefficient motivates our use of the cross-product α as a measure of association in the definitions of the principles of mean preserving increasing (decreasing) rearrangement as well as in Definitions 3.1A and 3.1B, although the condition of fixed marginal distributions allows the use of the correlation coefficient in the latter definitions. ( p , p , p , p ) where ( p , p , p , p ) where 
is said to provide a mean preserving negative association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement if
It follows straightforward from Definitions 3.2A and 3.2B that the mean preserving association principles make a mean preserving rearrangement that reduces the number of people suffering from indicator X 1 at the cost of increasing the number of people suffering from indicator X 2 when > > > > 0 δ and vice versa when < < < < 0 δ . As illustrated by Table 3 .3 the right (left) panel can be obtained from the left (right) panel by a mean preserving positive increasing (decreasing) rearrangement, since the association is negative and the mean is kept fixed equal to 1 under the rearrangement where ( p , p , p , p ) where 
is said to provide a mean preserving negative association
As is demonstrated by Theorems 3.1A below, a social planner who is in favour of seconddegree downward dominance will consider a mean preserving positive association increasing rearrangement as well as a mean preserving negative association decreasing rearrangement as a rise in overall deprivation. By contrast, a planner who favours upward second-degree dominance will consider such rearrangement as a reduction in the overall deprivation. Moreover, it is proved that the principles of mean preserving association increasing/decreasing rearrangement are equivalent to the mean preserving spread/contraction defined by 
Note that Definition 3.4 is equivalent to a sequence of the mean preserving spread introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . This is easily seen by combining statements (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3.1A and equation (A5) By combining Theorems 2.2A and 3.1A and Theorems 2.2B and 3.1B it follows that the D Γ -measures satisfy the association intervention principles introduced above, where a distinction has been made between whether an association rearrangement comes from a distribution characterized by positive or negative association.
Accounting for different weights
Replacing the outcome 1 by the weights w 1 and w 2 as outcomes for the marginal indicator distributions in the two-dimensional case, the distribution of deprivation for two dimensions is given by the following table The equivalence between (i) and (iii) follows directly from Theorem 2.2 A.
D F D F t d F t F t F t F t dt u F t F t dtdu

D ( F ) D ( F ) ( u ) ( F ( t ) F ( t ))dtdu
The proof of Theorem 4.1B is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.1A. Thus, by using arguments like those in the proof of Theorem 4.1A the results of Theorem 4.1B are obtained.
